Dryblower' view of all this is that if the money is the right colour, and what money is the wrong colour, then take the $1.62 a share De Beers is offering for Ashton Mining, a 40% shareholder in Argyle, and say thank you very much to the nice South African gentleman.
But, while banking the cheque consider a few mysteries of life.
Why did De Beers engage in the infamous "sorting line drift", a largely unexplained dispute between it and Argyle back in the 1980s when, for some strange reason, values applied to Argyle stones by De Beers kept getting lower?
Why did De Beers fail to fully promote Argyle gems in world diamond centres, only to watch Ashton and its 60% partner, Rio Tinto, launch a spectacularly successful promotional effort which turned beer-bottle brown diamonds into cognac and champagne gems?
Why did De Beers flood the Mumbai diamond centre with cheap Argyle-type goods when its marketing deal with Rio Tinto and Ashton collapsed in 1996?
These are indeed great mysteries - though Dryblower, naturally, has a theory.
It's called the: "if you can't beat them, join them theory"
You know the one, it's when De Beers wakes up one bright morning in its creaky old headquarters building in Stockdale Street, Kimberley, and says: "oh dear, we seem to be losing control of the world diamond market. Those clever kids at Argyle have given us a sound thrashing in the lesson of how to sell diamonds"
Joking aside, De Beers has been facing a horrid time.
Argyle has re-written the diamond sellers rulebook. It has actually gone to its customers, asked what they want, set up joint marketing programs and delivered on its promises.
At the same time, the wider world diamond trade has been running out of control. The Russians are being naughty in slipping surplus stones into the market (they always have, actually), the Liberians and Angolans have been fighting wars over diamonds, and the damned Canadians keep finding more of the brilliant baubles under the tundra.
It has been all of these factors which have forced De Beers to admit that it has to change its ways. No longer can it summon its wholesale clients (quaintly called "sight" holders) and give them a parcel of gems - with a price tag attached, and no questions or you don't get invited back to the next sight.
No. De Beers is having to learn a bit about marketing. About controlling the market through finesse and skill, rather than a blunt instrument.
That, at least, is the theory - though not necessarily one to which Dryblower subscribes.
He believes that old dogs rarely learn new tricks and he wonders what plans De Beers might have for Argyle once it gets to 40%.
The first step will probably be to get to 100% by buying out arch-rival Rio Tinto. Those two make strange bedfellows, especially after De Beers sister company, Anglo American, suffered so many bruises in its encounter with Rio in the battle for North.
And if De Beers gets to 100% of Argyle, what then?
What is in De Beers' best interest? To grow Argyle, develop a deep mine and learn the marketing skills of the Argyle team?
Think about that one, because there is another theory which says that De Beers self-interest might be better served by closing Argyle - for a while anyway.
Why? Because in the backrooms of Stockdale Street in South Africa and Charterhouse Street in London is a US$3 billion stockpile of diamonds - much of them Argyle-type stones and left-overs from the time when De Beers controlled the market by soaking up the world's surplus gems.
De Beers could do very well from owning Argyle, though why would it want more gems when it has that infamous stockpile?
De Beers could do well, but it could do even better from shutting the mine, pushing up the price of the stockpile, and then re-opening Argyle at its leisure.
Here endeth Dryblower' thought for the week.
Let the fun begin.
Toodlepip,
Dryblower.
